Symposium: Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering with Teachers\u27 First Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning by Wohl, Alexander
American University Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 5 Article 7
2009
Symposium: Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After
Forty Years of Tinkering with Teachers' First
Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning
Alexander Wohl
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Conference & Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wohl, Alexander. “Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering with Teachers' First Amendment Rights, Time for a
New Beginning.” American University Law Review 58, no. 5 ( June 2009): 1285-1321.
Symposium: Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering
with Teachers' First Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning
Abstract
This Article will examine how (and how far) we have fallen from the legal precedent and educational
principles behind Tinker, specifically the increasingly remote standards courts have used to chip away (and
sometimes sledgehammer) the speech rights of teachers. To this end, the Article will consider some of the
unique and fundamental characteristics associated with a profession that has at its core the mission of
encouraging speech, raising questions, and teaching the ability to think—in short, “expressive activities.” It
will also look at how the increasingly restrictive standards do not reflect fully the challenges posed by the
advent of new technologies that increase (intentionally or not) communications between students and
teachers. Finally, the Article will explore the possibility of future courses of action that can help restore
teachers to their unique place in First Amendment (and public employee) law while maintaining an
appropriate deference to the singular characteristics of our locally based and controlled educational system
and appropriate limits on what a teacher may or may not say to students in or out of a classroom.
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“I cannot teach anybody.  I can only make them think.” 
Socrates 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District1 is one of those rare rulings that 
almost immediately became a part of the pantheon of “hallmark” 
Supreme Court cases—opinions known not simply by lawyers as a 
matter of constitutional interpretation and precedent, but by a 
broader portion of the population as a piece of American history 
itself.2  The decision was relatively straightforward, upholding the 
rights of three students to wear black armbands in connection with a 
Vietnam War protest and finding that school officials may restrict 
student speech only if that speech “materially and substantially 
disrupt[s] the work and discipline of the school.”3  Notwithstanding 
the ruling’s relatively ordinary character, several possible reasons 
exist for its instant and continuing status:  It may have been the 
general drama of a conflict that involved a student First Amendment 
symbolic speech challenge—the wearing of a black armband to 
protest a war at the height of ‘60s student activism.  Or, it may have 
been because the prohibited speech directly involved the 
constitutional rights available to students and teachers, which in turn 
made the decision a “teachable moment” in classrooms across the 
country.4  Perhaps it was the combination of the language and 
                                                 
 1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 2. See, e.g., Kay S. Hymowitz, Tinker and the Lessons from the Slippery Slope,  
48 DRAKE L. REV. 547, 548 (2000) (calling Tinker a “signal moment” in our liberation 
from the social hierarchies of the 1950s); Leonard M. Niehoff, The Student’s Right to 
Freedom of Speech:  How Much Is Left at the Schoolhouse Gate?, 75 MICH. B.J. 1150, 1150 
(1996) (calling Tinker a “landmark” decision); Nadine Strossen, Keeping the 
Constitution Inside the Schoolhouse Gate—Students’ Rights Thirty Years After Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 445, 447 (2000) 
(discussing the importance of the Tinker case in free speech jurisprudence); William 
Bird, Note, Constitutional Law—True Threat Doctrine and Public School Speech—An 
Expansive View of a School’s Authority to Discipline Allegedly Threatening Student Speech 
Arising Off Campus, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 111, 124 (2003) (“Any analysis of 
student free speech rights begins with the landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District.”).  It is worth noting that public knowledge of 
Supreme Court decisions is a relative concept given that lack of awareness of the 
Supreme Court and understanding of its rulings is more the rule.  See, e.g., 
Findlaw.com, Findlaw’s U.S. Supreme Court Awareness Survey, 
http://public.findlaw.com/ussc/122005survey.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) 
(finding that fifty-seven percent of adult American’s could not name any current U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice).  But see VALERIE HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS 6 (2003) (arguing that the conventional notion that the public is 
largely ignorant of information about the Court is flawed because this conclusion is 
often based on national public polls instead of examining how cases are viewed 
within the local communities they impact). 
 3. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 4. Cf. Gary L. Reglin, Public School Educators’ Knowledge of Selected Supreme Court 
Decisions Affecting Daily Public School Operations, 7 J. RES. RURAL EDUC. 17 (1990), 
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context of Justice Abe Fortas’s opinion itself—the dramatic, bold and 
distinctly non-legalese turns of phrase used by the Court in stating 
that neither “students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate”5—with the 
culmination of the individual rights revolution of the Warren Court.6  
Or perhaps it was that it weaved together themes and views that 
captured the essence of the profession of teaching and the role of 
education in our democracy.  Whatever the reason, forty years later, 
Tinker remains one of the most resounding, eloquent, and perhaps 
utopian statements about free expression, a marker of the 
significance of the relationship between academic freedom and 
educational rigor in our democracy. 
And yet, even as this reputation has been maintained and 
enhanced, with zealous students, committed teachers, and vigorous 
First Amendment and education lawyers continuing to cite Tinker’s 
prose as a virtual mantra, the disheartening truth is that the Tinker 
decision represented a high point of student and teacher rights.  
Since Tinker, these rights have been steadily whittled away, 
shortchanged in the name of enforcing academic discipline and 
pedagogical interests,7 a purported need to balance school-related 
issues against the “public concern”8 and even against the measure of a 
teacher’s official duties itself.9 
This Article will examine how (and how far) we have fallen from 
the legal precedent and educational principles behind Tinker, 
specifically the increasingly remote standards courts have used to 
chip away (and sometimes sledgehammer) the speech rights of 
teachers.  To this end, the Article will consider some of the unique 
and fundamental characteristics associated with a profession that has 
                                                 
available at http://jrre.psu.edu/articles/v7,n1,p17-22,Reglin.pdf (discussing how 
research indicating a lack of awareness among educators of Supreme Court decisions 
affecting education suggests a need for educator training in public school law). 
 5. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 6. For background on the Warren Court, see generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE 
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); Alexander Wohl, The Warren Court, in 
5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 173–79 (David S. 
Tanenhaus ed., 2008). 
 7. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) 
(allowing schools to control student speech in “school-sponsored expressive 
activities” when the school’s action is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns”). 
 8. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 391 
U.S. 563, 568 (1968).   
 9. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding statements made by 
public employees pursuant to their official duties are not afforded full constitutional 
proection under the First Amendment). 
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at its core the mission of encouraging speech, raising questions, and 
teaching the ability to think—in short, “expressive activities.”10  It will 
also look at how the increasingly restrictive standards do not reflect 
fully the challenges posed by the advent of new technologies that 
increase (intentionally or not) communications between students 
and teachers.  Finally, the Article will explore the possibility of future 
courses of action that can help restore teachers to their unique place 
in First Amendment (and public employee) law while maintaining an 
appropriate deference to the singular characteristics of our locally-
based and controlled educational system and appropriate limits on 
what a teacher may or may not say to students in or out of a 
classroom. 
I. THE STORY SO FAR— A HISTORY OF COURTS EMBRACING THE ROLE 
OF TEACHERS AND EDUCATION 
To best understand how this area of the law has developed, where 
it falls short, and what Tinker means today, it may be helpful to 
consider teacher speech issues in two broad categories:  direct 
classroom speech and what can be most easily called (but which 
encompasses far more than this limited term) extracurricular speech.  
The first category involves speech by teachers that is arguably 
curricular in nature, classroom-based, and that has a direct and 
intentional impact on students.  Ironically, perhaps, the leading cases 
in this area, known generically as the Tinker-Hazelwood line of cases, 
are premised on challenges to student speech, and simply apply those 
principles to teachers rather than establish a specific or distinct right 
of expression for teachers.11  As one noted commentator in the field 
has explained, the Supreme Court “has danced around the issue of 
applying the First Amendment to teachers’ in-class speech.”12 
                                                 
 10. See Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Academic Freedom, 9 GREEN BAG 17, 22–23 
(2005) (noting that “public educational institutions are not unlike government 
owned and operated libraries, museums, and other organizations that have an 
essentially expressive function”); Zachary Martin, Comment, Public School Teachers’ 
First Amendment Rights:  In Danger in the Wake of “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 
1183, 1183 (2008) (stating that a “teacher’s typical school day involves . . . 
describ[ing] concepts, show[ing] pictures, play[ing] films,” all of which are 
“expressive activities”).   
 11. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).   
 12. Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act:  Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First 
Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 4 (2001); see also Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public School 
Teachers and the First Amendment:  Protecting the Right To Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 
694–95 (1990) (stating that “the Supreme Court never has addressed directly the 
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This is not to say that the role of teachers and the importance of 
their speech have not been recognized by the courts for its unique 
and important role in shaping our democracy.  Nor that it is on par 
with that of students, who must face the additional burden of being 
minors and, therefore, are not given the full range of rights they 
would have as adults in many areas of the law.  When it comes to the 
specific role of teachers in classrooms, however, courts have shied 
away from establishing an individual standard.  In part, this is because 
there have always been strong limits placed on teachers through this 
nation’s tradition of local control of education.  As the Supreme 
Court has noted, “[n]o single tradition in public education is more 
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local 
autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance 
of community concern and support for public schools and the quality 
of the educational process.”13  Within this local control exists an 
inherent political structure and power arrangement in which school 
boards, not teachers, control curricula.  The limited role of teachers 
also comes about from concerns over indoctrinating impressionable 
youth, whether related to values, politics, or personal behavior.14  The 
younger a student is, the greater the concern about the subject 
matter being taught.15  Accordingly, K-12 teachers are given less 
leeway on so-called academic freedom issues than are college 
instructors.  Thus, for instance, there is little debate (but still 
frequent litigation) about elementary and secondary teachers who 
                                                 
extent to which [public school teachers] carry first amendment rights into the 
classroom”). 
 13. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974); see Richard W. Riley, The 
Role of the Federal Government in Education—Supporting a National Desire for Support for 
State and Local Education, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 29, 30 (1997) (noting that “the 
day-to-day administration and operation of schools have remained the work of local 
and private authorities”). 
 14. See Welner, supra note 22, at 975–79 (discussing schools’ inculcative role 
throughout American history).  For example, Horace Mann, an education pioneer 
and the first Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education, “expressed concern 
that educators too often ignored students ‘moral natures’ and ‘social affections.’”  Id. 
at 976–77.  Accordingly, Mann “called for greater state control over school curricula 
and practices.”  Id. at 977. 
 15. Cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).  There, the 
Court stated: 
[A] school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the 
intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech 
on potentially sensitive topics, which might range from the existence of 
Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage 
sexual activity in a high school setting. 
Id. 
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seek to wear campaign buttons into the classroom.16  It is anything but 
a new concern.  In the fourth century B.C., Socrates was sentenced to 
death after being found guilty of corrupting the minds of the youth 
of Athens.17 
The second broad category involves speech by teachers in their 
personal capacity or, if made in their role as teacher, that which is 
unintended to have a direct impact or influence on students. This 
category includes communications on matters involving school-
related issues, such as school conditions, education funding, or 
personnel matters.  Unlike curricular speech, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly and definitively outlined and embraced the rights of 
teachers with respect to this question.18  More recently, however, the 
Court has grouped teachers within the broader category of public 
employees, which has led to a further limiting of their rights of 
expression and communication.19  This analysis is known as the 
Pickering-Connick-Garcetti line of cases.20 
Under both of these strands of analysis, teachers have lost ground.  
Furthermore, the courts have increasingly conflated and merged the 
two strands, blurring the line between curricular and non-curricular 
speech, in and out of class activities, and matters of public and non-
public concern.21  This blurring, combined with the failure of many 
courts to adequately address technological advances affecting 
communications, has created an area of murkiness for teachers and 
                                                 
  16.  See, e.g., Weingarten v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New 
York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  While upholding the prohibition on 
campaign buttons, the judge allowed teachers to place campaign material into 
colleagues mailboxes and hang posters on bulletin boards maintained by the union, 
as long as they were off limits to students. Id. at 522; see also J.M. Brown, Soquel High 
teachers asked to remove Obama Buttons in class, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2008. 
 17. JAMES A. COLAICO, SOCRATES AGAINST ATHENS:  PHILOSOPHY ON TRIAL 1 (2001). 
 18. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (noting a threshold 
question of whether the statement is a matter of public concern); Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972) (affirming that a non-tenured teacher, whose 
contract was not renewed after he spoke out against the Board of Regents, must be 
afforded due process); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will 
County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (rejecting the implicit conclusion of the Illinois 
Supreme Court that teachers may be constitutionally compelled to surrender First 
Amendment rights in the context of public policy criticisms of their school boards).  
 19. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (considering previous case 
law concerning teacher speech rights to determine whether a deputy district 
attorney’s First Amendment rights were violated when he was terminated for a letter 
he wrote in favor of dismissing a case). 
 20. See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 
2007) (applying the Pickering-Connick-Garcetti analysis). 
 21. See infra Part IV (discussing Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 
794 (5th Cir. 1989) and Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th 
Cir. 1998)). 
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has limited their ability to be innovative in the classroom and 
responsive to the needs of the school environment. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Though Tinker is among the most well-known and arguably most 
expansive free speech cases, it followed in a long line of cases that 
embraced the principle that a school should be a “marketplace of 
ideas”22 and that teachers are a critical merchant within this 
marketplace.  Indeed, the significance of teachers has a long and 
distinguished history within the case law that goes far beyond the two 
simple words in Justice Fortas’s opinion in Tinker—“or teachers”—
that significantly broadened the population of who does not shed 
their rights at the schoolhouse gate.  On numerous occasions, the 
Supreme Court had expounded on the significance of teaching and 
teachers as a critical part of our society in terms of development of 
students’ ability to be engaged fully in our democratic traditions.  In 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,23 for instance, the 
Court upheld a student’s right not to say the Pledge of Allegiance to 
begin each school day, and in so doing laid the foundation for First 
Amendment protections for school-related activities.24  As the Court 
explained, the fact that schools “are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
Freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at 
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our 
government as mere platitudes.”25  This has special relevance related 
to the actions and speech of teachers, as Justice Felix Frankfurter 
noted in 1952: 
It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-
mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible 
citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective 
public opinion.  Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and 
                                                 
 22. See Kevin Welner, Locking up the Marketplace of Ideas and Locking Out School 
Reform:  Courts’ Imprudent Treatment of Controversial Teaching in America’s Public Schools, 
50 UCLA L. REV. 959, 980–86 (2003) (discussing the “marketplace of ideas” concept 
originally set forth in Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)).  While the 
concept of the marketplace of ideas as embraced by the Supreme Court has 
significant positive ramifications for teacher speech, Professor Welner also notes that 
“the concept of schools as marketplace of ideas is most accurately viewed as 
protecting the right of students to shop, rather than as protecting the right of 
teachers to sell.”  Id. at 987–88. 
 23. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 24. Id. at 642. 
 25. Id. at 637. 
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practice, by the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be 
exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry.  They cannot 
carry out their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a 
responsible and critical mind are denied them.26 
Tinker itself was actually the third of three significant Supreme 
Court cases decided in successive years at the end of the turbulent 
1960s, each of which considered legal implications of, or protections 
for, speech in an education context.27  In Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents,28 the Court struck down a McCarthy-era New York law that 
forced university faculty members to certify that they were not 
members of communist or other subversive organizations.29  Although 
it did not address or outline specific protections for teachers in 
rejecting that law, the Court did further enunciate the significance of 
the principles of the freedom to teach and learn: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic 
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely 
to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special 
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that 
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. “The vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools.”  The classroom is peculiarly 
the “marketplace of ideas.”  The Nation’s future depends upon 
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of 
ideas which discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] 
than through any kind of authoritative selection.”30 
The Court built on the language and principles of several earlier 
decisions that grew out of the McCarthy era, a period when freedom 
of thought and expression was in short supply.  Indeed, teachers, 
among many others, were often required to sign loyalty oaths, and 
independent thought and speech were not simply grounds for 
discipline, but for firing and subsequent investigation and arrest.31  
Already noted was Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in 
Wieman v. Updegraff,32 which struck down a state loyalty oath.33  Justice 
William O. Douglas made a similar point in a dissenting opinion in 
                                                 
 26. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 27. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering 
v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 28. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 29. Id. at 609–10. 
 30. Id. at 603 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 31. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 10, at 22. 
 32. 344 U.S. 183, 194–98 (1952) (Frankfurter J., concurring). 
 33. Id. at 191. 
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another case involving state loyalty oaths, Adler v. Board of Education.34  
He stated:  “The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and 
expression to everyone in our society.  All are entitled to it and none 
needs it more than the teacher.”35 
One of the most important teacher-related decisions during the 
McCarthy era was Sweezy v. New Hampshire.36  Sweezy was another ruling 
that flowed from the restrictive and often excessive McCarthy-era laws 
that seriously impinged First Amendment rights.  In Sweezy, the Court 
explained that “scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of 
suspicion and distrust.  Teachers and students must always remain 
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”37  It 
was an important point in which the Court implicitly stated that 
educators were different from other public employees.  In fact, it was 
precisely because of principles of academic freedom that educators 
became more willing to challenge government authority, which in 
turn, strengthened the educational system and our democracy.38 
The year after deciding Keyishian, the Court looked specifically at 
the level of scrutiny and protection that a teacher’s actions received 
within the school walls, though not directly related to teaching 
activities.  Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 
205, Will County, Illinois39 involved a public school teacher who had 
written to the local newspaper criticizing the school board and 
superintendent for how they spent school funds.40  In upholding the 
teacher’s right to express views on a matter of legitimate public 
concern and finding fault with the school policy as presenting 
inadequate grounds for dismissal, the Court again embraced the 
                                                 
 34. 342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589 (1967). 
 35. Id. at 508 (Douglass, J., dissenting). 
 36. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 37. Id. at 250. 
 38. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 423–26 
(2004) (discussing University of Chicago President Robert Maynard Hutchins’ efforts 
in 1949 to protect the free speech rights of the school’s faculty and students, who 
were under attack by red-baiting Illinois politicians).  Some schools became havens 
for professors forced to leave their institutions as a result of the red-baiting of the 
period. Indeed, Brandeis University, created in 1948, quickly became a leading 
liberal arts institution because it refused to question the political background of its 
professors, judging them only on their intellectual merit.  See MARTY JEZER, ABBIE 
HOFFMAN:  AMERICAN REBEL 21 (1993) (stating that Senator Joseph McCarthy’s 
reluctance to investigate Brandeis University can be attributed to his fear that he 
would be accused of anti-Semitism and citing this as a reason that Brandeis became a 
home to many blacklisted professors). 
 39. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 40. Id. at 564–67. 
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significance of the teacher’s role as an important member of the 
community.41  It stated: 
To the extent that the [lower court’s] opinion may be read to 
suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to 
relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy 
as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection 
with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it 
proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in 
numerous prior decisions of this Court.42 
But even as the Court found favor in that historic principle, it 
created a standard that ultimately would bode ill for those rights—a 
balancing test for gauging the importance of teachers’ speech within 
the context of their role as public employees. 
Writing for the Court in Pickering, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
described  the limits of criticism a teacher can constitutionally 
demonstrate, stating that courts must “arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern, and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”43  Marshall’s goal was to ensure that more high-minded 
critiques offered by teachers were protected, but that more mundane 
things, such as personal attacks, or statements based on private 
disagreements, were not.  Ultimately, he concluded, the present case 
was one 
in which a teacher has made erroneous public statements upon 
issues then currently the subject of public attention, which are 
critical of his ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor 
can be presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher’s 
proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have 
interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally.44 
In these circumstances, he continued, “we conclude that the 
interest of the school administration in limiting teachers’ 
opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly 
greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any 
member of the general public.”45 
                                                 
 41. See id. at 572 (stating that “[t]eachers are, as a class, the members of the 
community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds 
allotted to the operations of the school should be spent”). 
 42. Id. at 568 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), and Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)). 
 43. Id. at 568. 
 44. Id. at 572–73. 
 45. Id. at 573. 
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In at least one respect, the Court’s analysis in Pickering, elaborated 
on in subsequent decisions, indicated that teachers—in contrast to 
other public employees—play a special role when discussing issues of 
public concern, particularly those involving the school.  In Perry v. 
Sindermann,46 for instance, a case involving consideration of a 
professor’s due process rights in light of the Texas state college 
system’s failure to renew his contract after policy disputes with the 
Board of Regents, the Court specifically noted with favor the 
constitutional significance of “a teacher’s public criticism of his 
superiors on matters of public concern.”47  Even more significant was 
the Court’s decision in another case to uphold a nonunion teacher’s 
right to speak on a matter related to ongoing collective bargaining.  
In City of Madison, Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission,48 the Court reaffirmed that teachers “are the very 
core of [the school] system; restraining teachers’ expressions to the 
board on matters involving the operation of the schools would 
seriously impair the board’s ability to govern the district.”49  Thus, by 
the time the Court decided Tinker, it had provided plenty of legal and 
rhetorical ammunition to support the principles of free speech within 
an education setting. 
II. CHIPPING AWAY AT TEACHER RIGHTS 
 A. Early Limits and Balancing  
The Tinker-Keyishian-Pickering trio of cases provided an important 
marker that, in the short term at least, helped broaden the 
communication rights of teachers by emphasizing not only their 
value but also the important link between teaching, education, and 
principles of academic freedom.50  But even as these decisions 
acknowledged this value and connection, they also unmistakably laid 
the groundwork for a virtual elimination of this right.51  This was the 
result of both a narrowing of speech protections, through the 
creation of new legal tests, and a convergence of the two strands of 
analyses.  In the case of in-class speech, the courts placed greater 
emphasis on the risk of that speech disrupting the school 
                                                 
 46. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
 47. Id. at 598 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 
 48. 429 U.S. 167 (1976). 
 49. Id. at 177. 
 50. See supra Part I. 
 51. See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (discussing language from 
Tinker that has been misapplied by courts). 
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environment or harming the students who might be on the receiving 
end.52  In the case of extracurricular speech, the courts added new 
emphasis to the public value the speech was required to have.53 
Tinker acknowledged and reaffirmed—in as prominent a place as 
the sentences immediately prior to and following the “schoolhouse 
gate” language—the need to balance what is said based on the 
potential disruption of the classroom and the maturity of who is on 
the receiving end.54  In the preceding sentence the Court noted that 
“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students.”55  Just a 
few sentences later the Court stated, “[o]n the other hand, the Court 
has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive 
authority of . . . school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to . . . control conduct in the schools.”56  
Although the Court probably did not realize it at the time, that 
measured language would be misappropriated and become a primary 
rationale in subsequent decisions as a means of limiting the speech of 
teachers as well as students. 
In Board of Education v. Pico,57 the Court reached a decision that was 
positive for the First Amendment by finding unconstitutional a 
decision by school officials to remove books from a library on purely 
political grounds.58  But the language in the decision nonetheless laid 
the groundwork for expanding the discretion that school boards have 
in this area to prescribe curriculum matters (including library 
resources) as part of the duty to teach community values.  That next 
step was taken in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,59 in which the 
Court allowed school officials to suppress vulgar speech by a student 
in a nominating speech for another student during a school-
sponsored assembly.60  Both the trial and appeals courts in Fraser had 
ruled that the school did not have the power to punish the student 
for the offensive speech, concluding that the speech was 
                                                 
 52. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)); infra notes 57–64 and accompanying text 
(discussing Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 53. See infra Part III (discussing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), Kirkland 
v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989), and Boring v. Buncombe 
County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 54. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 55. Id. (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. at 507. 
 57. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 58. Id. at 871–72. 
 59. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 60. Id. at 685. 
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“indistinguishable from the protest armband in Tinker.”61  But the 
Supreme Court disagreed and rejected the comparison with Tinker.62  
In fact, the Court employed a subtle reference to the importance of 
education as a means of limiting the communications that go on in a 
school:  “[S]chools must teach by example the shared values of a 
civilized social order,” the Court stated in language that previously 
might have prefaced a discussion striking down administrative 
sanctions.63  Instead, the Court used this as a rationale for concluding 
that the school district was within its power to impose sanctions on 
Fraser for his “offensively lewd and indecent speech.”64 
B. The Hazelwood Hazard 
The most significant of the post-Tinker decisions within the 
curriculum line of cases is Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.65  In 
Hazelwood, the Supreme Court upheld a principal’s decision to censor 
the student newspaper by removing several articles that he felt were 
objectionable because they dealt with students’ experiences with 
pregnancy and the impact of divorce.66  The crux of the decision was 
the Court’s finding that the school newspaper was a non-public 
forum and, as such, “school officials may impose reasonable 
restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members 
of the school community.”67  Hazelwood is another case in which the 
facts involved student speech and in which the negative application 
to teachers was derivative (but just as detrimental).  Not only did 
teachers and administrators have the right to prevent this kind of 
speech, the Court continued, but they also could bar a variety of 
other types of speech under a standard that ultimately “may be 
higher than those demanded by some newspaper publishers or 
theatrical producers in the ‘real’ world.”68  The bottom line, the 
Court stated, is that educators may exercise censorial powers over the 
style and content of student speech if that control is “reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”69 
                                                 
 61. Id. at 679. 
 62. Id. at 685. 
 63. Id. at 683. 
 64. Id. at 685. 
 65. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 66. Id. at 274–76. 
 67. Id. at 267. 
 68. Id. at 272. 
 69. Id. at 273. 
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The Court specifically sought to reassure that it was not rejecting its 
holding in Tinker or the “‘special characteristics of the school 
environment’” that Tinker and previous decisions had emphasized.70  
To this end, the Court contrasted the personal expressions of a 
student that happened to occur on school premises (Tinker) with 
expressions or actions involved with school-sponsored activities and that 
“members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 
imprimatur of the school” (Hazelwood).71  The Court further 
suggested that the issue was one of the differences between whether 
the First Amendment requires a school “to tolerate” particular speech 
rather than “affirmatively to promote” it.72  But, as Justice Brennan noted 
in dissent, the opinion actually went much further.73  Though 
Brennan focused on the impact to student speech rights and what he 
called high school students being “denude[d] . . . of much of th[eir] 
First Amendment protection,” he also highlighted the equally 
dangerous impact on the role played by educators themselves, noting 
that the effect is “particularly insidious from one to whom the public 
entrusts the task of inculcating in its youth an appreciation for the 
cherished democratic liberties that our Constitution guarantees.”74 
Hazelwood has been criticized on many levels,75 not the least of 
which is the way it contradicts and interferes with the underlying 
mission of the school itself by eliminating the balance between 
administrators, teachers, students, and parents in favor of the safety 
                                                 
 70. Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969)). 
 71. Id. at 271. 
 72. Id. at 270–71 (emphasis added). 
 73. Id. at 277–91 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 289. 
 75. See, e.g., Scott Andrew Felder, Stop the Presses:  Censorship and the High School 
Journalist, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 433, 448–51 (2000) (arguing that the Court’s reasoning was 
flawed for a number of reasons, including its failure to “justify its creation of a 
second standard by which student speech would be tested”); Alexander Wohl, The 
Hazelwood Hazard:  Litigating and Legislating in the State Domain when Federal Avenues 
Are Closed, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 9–13 (1992) (characterizing the decision as a 
“‘blight on the world of scholastic journalism’”); Christopher J. Palermo, Note, Only 
the News That’s Fit To Print:  Student Expressive Rights in Public School Communications 
Media After Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 11 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 35, 68–70 (1988) 
(arguing that the Hazelwood standard is flawed because it is “subject to abuse from 
overly broad interpretation” and it “undermine[s] the effectiveness of student 
newspapers as an educational tool”); Jeffrey D. Smith, Comment, High School 
Newspapers and the Public Forum Doctrine:  Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,  
74 VA. L. REV. 843, 861 (1988) (“The . . . sweeping language has placed students at 
the mercy of school officials.”); see also Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse 
Gate:  The Diminishing First Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 37, 
63–67 (2008) (stating that “Hazelwood has often served as a basis for substantially 
restricting teachers’ First Amendment rights in the classroom”). 
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net of complete control in the name of pedagogical concerns.76  But 
also, as Justice Brennan pointed out, the endorsement of 
administrative censorship undercuts the principles of teaching, 
learning, and intellectual questioning that are central to a school 
environment and the development of young minds.77  This is 
especially harmful to teachers and their role in the broader 
educational mission of schools to help students learn how to think 
and be thoughtful participants in American democracy.  Moreover, 
by further equating students and teachers within the framework of 
“legitimate pedagogical concerns,” the decision undermines what 
little intellectual independence or control teachers had left 
concerning either issues of curricula or the classroom.78  It confirms 
that teacher innovation in support of developing intellectual curiosity 
and promoting educational rigor is less at the center of the mission of 
schools than intellectual control, conformity, and political 
expedience.  A legitimate pedagogical concern is merely what a 
school board or other administrative authority says it is.79 
As many subsequent lower court decisions citing Hazelwood have 
made clear, teachers have been left with little in the way of what they 
can say or the impact they can have on students or in-classroom 
activities, let alone curricular decisions.80  Typical of this line of cases 
is a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
that explicitly linked Tinker and Hazelwood in rejecting a challenge 
from a teacher placed on administrative leave.81  In Miles v. Denver 
Public Schools,82 a teacher had made statements in class concerning 
                                                 
 76. See Daly, supra note 12, at 11–16 (“The use of an undifferentiated standard 
for students and teachers ignores the legal distinctions and different level of 
constitutional protection afforded to children and adults, resulting in insufficient 
protection for teacher speech and contributing to the denigration of teachers as 
professionals.”). 
 77. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 283–85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 78. Daly, supra note 12, at 13–16. 
 79. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 10, at 20 (citing Settle v. Dickson County, 53 
F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 80. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 
F.2d 817, 830 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (upholding a school district’s refusal to allow 
Planned Parenthood to publish advertisements in school newspapers); Poling v. 
Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding no First or Fourteenth 
Amendment violations of a student’s rights where a principal’s disqualified the 
student from student elections after the student made a campaign speech critical of 
the administration); Krizek v. Bd. of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (N.D. Ill. 1989) 
(denying a preliminary injunction for a teacher whose employment contract was not 
renewed after she showed an R-rated film to her students).  
 81. Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 82. 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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rumors that students were engaged in sexual activity during recess.83  
The circuit court noted that while “‘students in the public schools do 
not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate, . . . educators do not offend the 
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over school-
sponsored expression ‘so long as their actions are reasonably related 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”84 
Two parts of this encapsulation are particularly revealing and 
troubling in terms of their application to the rights of teachers.  The 
first is that the court failed to even include the word “teacher” from 
the original quotation it cited from Tinker.85  The second is that the 
court left out teachers from the category of “educators” who have 
“control over school-sponsored expression,” which directly prefaces 
the “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” 
language.86  In short, teachers are in a virtual no-man’s land, stuck 
with the diminishing First Amendment rights applied to students and 
yet treated in an equally limited way by administrators. 
An even more recent Supreme Court decision is worth noting in 
this brief survey of diminishing First Amendment returns.  In Morse v. 
Frederick,87 the Court added yet another limitation on student speech 
that is likely to have an impact on teacher speech.  The school 
suspended a student, Joseph Frederick, who had held a large banner 
with the message “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” during a school-sanctioned 
activity, observing the torch relay for the Winter Olympic Games.88  
The Supreme Court narrowly upheld the student’s punishment even 
though the student was not in school or even on school grounds at 
the time.89  The Morse Court based its decision on a confusing and 
incomplete examination of the public forum issue it had raised in 
Fraser, Hazelwood, and several other cases.90  By failing to examine a 
                                                 
 83. Id. at 774–75. 
 84. Id. at 775. 
 85. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969) (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 
(emphasis added)), with Miles, 944 F.2d at 775 (noting that “students in the public 
schools do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 86. See Miles, 944 F.2d at 775 (failing to include teachers within its definition of 
educators). 
 87. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 88. Id. at 2622–23. 
 89. Id. at 2624, 2629 (finding that Frederick’s banner was “school speech,” 
despite being across the street from the school, because he displayed it at a school-
sanctioned event while standing among teachers and fellow students).   
 90. Id. at 2626–28. 
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number of factual questions, such as whether Frederick should be 
considered a student at the time of his actions and whether the event 
was school-sponsored or mandatory, the Court essentially created 
another exception to the Tinker rule by expanding the world of the 
school’s non-public forum.91  The potential impact of this 
interpretation on teachers is significant in that it gives courts eager to 
limit teacher speech another bite at the apple.  Not surprisingly, 
redefining where speech is prohibited or expanding the nature of the 
school workplace can have a significant impact on a school’s ability to 
silence a teacher.92  Even more deleterious to teacher speech, 
however, is placing teachers within a whole other category and 
creating a rule that makes virtually anything he or she says prohibited 
and punishable by school officials. 
C. Closing the Schoolhouse Door—Teachers As (Just) Public Employees 
The impact of Hazelwood and its progeny on teachers’ rights was 
compounded as courts began to combine the curricular-based, 
pedagogical concerns test of Hazelwood and Tinker with the “matter of 
public concern” balancing test the Court had outlined in Pickering.93  
Worse yet, in subsequent decisions, the Court applied the Pickering 
test in a manner that completely eliminated what little “balance” 
there was.  In Pickering the Court had recognized that “a teacher’s 
exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not 
furnish the basis for a dismissal from public employment,” even if 
that speech is inaccurate.94  As the Court explained, the premise that 
“teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First 
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to 
comment on matters of public interest in connection with the 
operation of the public schools in which they work” is “a premise that 
                                                 
 91. Martin, supra note 10, at 1207. 
 92. Id. at 1207–08 (noting that the Supreme Court’s failure to even determine 
whether the banned student speech occurred in a public forum potentially bodes ill 
for teacher speech as well, since it “extends the classroom even further”). 
 93. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 139, 146 (1983) (concluding that 
government officials have wide latitude when their speech does not relate to 
political, social, or community concern); Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ. 
136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding teachers’ First Amendment rights are 
limited by school authorities); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 
802 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding curriculum disputes are not matters of public concern 
and thus not constitutionally protected speech).  
 94. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist 205, Will County, Ill., 391 
U.S. 563, 574 (1968). 
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has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this 
Court.”95 
But subsequent decisions would severely limit the protection that 
teachers received for their traditional role as informed commentators 
on education-related issues.  The Court’s holding in Connick v. Myers96 
was a first step.  In Connick, the Court upheld the right of Sheila Myers, 
an assistant district attorney, to distribute a questionnaire to her 
colleagues concerning office transfer policy, morale, confidence in 
superiors, and other similar issues.97  In reaching this conclusion, 
Connick applied Pickering and balanced the First Amendment rights of 
public employees against the rights of those employees as private 
citizens.98  But the Connick decision added a new element to the 
analysis:  whether the employee’s speech could be characterized as “a 
matter of public concern,” which the Court defined as “any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community.”99  Employing a 
rationale that sounded remarkably similar to the Court’s 
determination in Hazelwood regarding the need to maintain discipline 
in schools, the Court explained that “the Government, as an 
employer, must have wide discretion and control over the 
management of its personnel and internal affairs.”100 
Although Connick seemed harmless enough at the time, in part 
because of its holding in support of the employee, the significance of 
the introduction of the “public concern” test would prove daunting 
to free speech advocates in the years to come.  Indeed, it did not take 
long for other courts to link Connick to Pickering and Hazelwood and 
apply them as a one-two punch to teachers’ speech rights.  In Kirkland 
v. Northside Independent School District,101 for instance, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered and rejected the appeal of a 
high school history teacher who had been fired for using his own 
reading list rather than an administration-approved reading list.102  
The teacher also had failed to follow school guidelines for 
substituting alternative lists.103  Applying both the Pickering-Connick 
and Hazelwood analyses, the court first concluded that the teacher’s 
reading list was not a matter of public concern. 
                                                 
 95. Id. at 568. 
 96. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 97. Id. at 154. 
 98. Id. at 150–54. 
 99. Id. at 146. 
 100. Id. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974)). 
 101. 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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 [I]ssues do not rise to a level of ‘public concern’ by virtue of the 
speaker’s interest in the subject matter; rather, they achieve that 
protected status if the words or conduct are conveyed by the 
teacher in his role as a citizen and not in his role as an employee of the 
school district.104 
Then, in denying Kirkland’s claims of academic freedom, the court 
applied Hazelwood, noting that “school officials may impose 
reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other 
members of the school community.”105  While it is certainly easier to 
justify the restraint on teacher speech in Kirkland, in light of the 
generally understood rules on curricula that the teacher failed to 
follow, other instances of legal analysis applying these principles are 
less straight forward.  
Such was the case in the en banc opinion of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Boring v. Buncombe County Board of 
Education.106  In Boring, the court found no constitutional protection 
(under either the Hazelwood-Tinker or Pickering-Connick analyses) for a 
high school drama teacher who had complied with school policies, but 
who had still been reassigned because of her involvement with the 
use and performance of an arguably controversial play by an 
advanced acting class.107  The play, which included “mature subject 
matter,” had initially been used by the class at a regional drama 
competition.108  Later, a scene was performed for an English class at 
the school, at which time the drama teacher, Boring, had suggested 
requiring parental permission slips.109  After a parent complained, the 
principal cancelled the play’s remaining performances.110  The drama 
students were allowed to perform at a state competition, at which 
they won second place, with an edited version of the material.111  The 
                                                 
 104. Id. at 798–99. 
 105. Id. at 801 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 
(1988)). 
 106. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 107. Id. at 368. 
 108. Id. at 366. 
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 111. Id.  The principal allowed the students to participate in the state competition 
so long as objectionable scenes were deleted from the production.  Id.  While the 
complaint did not specifically allege that the students performed the edited version 
of the play, the court assumed that the performance was in conformity with the 
principal’s instructions.  Id. 
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following year the principal requested Boring’s transfer to another 
school.112 
In rejecting Boring’s claim, the court noted that under Hazelwood, 
the play was curricular in nature and therefore “by definition a 
legitimate pedagogical concern.”113  The court further noted that the 
play was not, as outlined in Connick, a matter of public concern, but 
simply an “ordinary employment dispute.”114  In a separate 
concurrence, Judge J. Michael Luttig left a bit of room for First 
Amendment protection of non-curricular teacher speech in the 
classroom115 but reaffirmed his  belief in the need for deference to 
school boards on curricular questions.  Judge Luttig also made clear 
his skeptical view of teachers, stating that “were every public school 
teacher in America to have the constitutional right to design (even in 
part) the content of his or her individual classes . . . schools would 
become mere instruments for the advancement of the individual and 
collective social agendas of . . . teachers.”116    
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Diana Gribbon Motz sharply 
criticized the majority as offering a rationale that was legally and 
intellectually faulty.117  Judge Motz suggested that, not only was the 
play a matter of public concern because it involved controversial and 
often debated topics, but also that no legitimate pedagogical concern 
was ever offered by the school.118  Finally, Judge Motz suggested that 
there were inherent and significant problems that arise when trying 
to pigeonhole all in-class teacher speech within a public employee 
model.119  
The final nail in the teacher speech coffin was hammered relatively 
recently with the Supreme Court’s sweeping 2006 decision in Garcetti 
v. Ceballos.120  Garcetti is another non-teacher case that has had an 
enormous impact on teachers by merging several analyses.  The 
                                                 
 112. See id. at 366–67 (stating that the transfer was approved because Boring “had 
failed to follow the school system’s controversial materials policy in producing the 
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 113. Id. at 370. 
 114. Id. at 368. 
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 120. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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Supreme Court combined Pickering’s balancing with Connick’s “public 
concern” and then added an entirely new and arbitrary standard that 
severely limits the rights of public employees generally, and teachers 
specifically, by “remov[ing] from teachers’ arsenal of protection . . . 
the long-recognized First Amendment right whereby an individual 
public employee’s speech may be protected from the power of the 
state.”121  Richard Ceballos was a Los Angeles County Deputy District 
Attorney who received notice from a defense attorney that an 
affidavit in an ongoing case was allegedly erroneous.122 After 
examining the warrant, Ceballos agreed with the defense attorney.123  
He subsequently wrote a memorandum to his supervisors on the issue 
and then met with them and the members of the sheriff’s department 
who had sworn the affidavit.124  In a motion on the warrant at trial, 
Ceballos was called as a witness by the defense attorney.125  The Court 
allowed the warrant and Ceballos subsequently was on the receiving 
end of what he said were retaliatory employment actions.126 
Justice Kennedy, speaking for a slim five-Justice majority, first 
applied the two-part Pickering test to determine whether Ceballos 
“spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern,” and if so, to 
determine whether “the relevant government entity had an adequate 
justification for treating the employee differently from any other 
member of the general public.”127  He then took that analysis a step 
further to find that “when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does 
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”128  
Since Ceballos’s examination of the warrant was undoubtedly part of 
his job description, it clearly fell within the Court’s new classification 
of “official duties,” and therefore was not protected by the First 
Amendment.129  In their dissenting opinions, Justices Stevens and 
Souter argued that the new bright-line rule imposed by the majority 
was both illogical and counterproductive.130  “[I]t is senseless to let 
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constitutional protection for exactly the same words hinge on 
whether they fall within a job description,” wrote Justice Stevens, 
noting further that such a rule would discourage employees from 
reporting questionable or even illegal behavior to their superiors 
precisely because of the fear of retaliation and the lack of 
protection.131  Justice Souter pointed out that the rule would likely 
lead to the creation of arbitrary, overbroad, and inaccurate job 
descriptions.132 
Not surprisingly, given that Garcetti shifted the burden to an 
employee when challenging an employer’s job-related action, the vast 
majority of decisions since then have gone against petitioners.133  As 
one district judge noted, with Garcetti, “the Supreme Court 
dramatically changed the landscape of retaliation cases brought by 
public employees . . . . This holding imposes a substantial new 
obstacle for employees:  most cases decided by the court of appeals 
since Garcetti have resulted in dismissal . . . .”134  Nowhere is this 
impact felt more clearly than in the teaching world, where there is no 
longer a serious path to follow for a court interested in supporting a 
teacher’s historic First Amendment rights, a teacher’s role as 
intellectual leader and challenger, or even as gadfly or critic on 
“matters of public concern.”135  Justice Souter addressed the all-
                                                 
 131. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 133. See Stuart, supra note 121, at 1283 (noting that in the year since the Court 
issued Garcetti, 280 lower court opinions have cited the ruling, most of which were 
favorable and upheld “the firing of any number of public employees including 
teachers”).  A similar search of cases citing Garcetti since then shows continued 
reliance on the holding and similar trends in terms of the success of public 
employees, and particularly teachers, contesting job related actions.  See, e.g., Amos v. 
District of Columbia, 589 F. Supp. 2d 48, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that a D.C. 
Department of Transportation worker’s statement to his superiors regarding 
contractor improprieties was made pursuant to his official duties and therefore, 
under Garcetti, not protected by the First Amendment); Bryant v. Gardner, 587  
F. Supp. 2d 951, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding that a teacher/high school basketball 
coach’s statements criticizing the principal’s decision to cancel “open gym” for his 
players were not protected speech because they were made pursuant to his official 
duties). 
 134. Doucette v. Minocqua, Hazelhurst & Lake Tomahawk Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
No. 07-cv-292-bbc, 2008 WL 2412988, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 12, 2008). Some courts 
have refused to apply Garcetti to teachers, either because of specific facts in the case 
or because they do not believe teachers should fall under this classification.  See 
Doucette v. Minocqua, No. 07-cv-292, 2008 WL 2412988 (W.D. Wis. June 12, 2008).  
However, even in cases in which courts have not applied Garcetti to public school 
teachers, they have still found against the teacher claims under the more traditional 
tests.  Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Ed. of Tipp City Exempted Village Sch. Dist.,  
No. 3:03cv091, 2008 WL 298174 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2008). 
 135. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 445 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
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encompassing quality of the ruling and the implications for higher 
education teachers in particular, saying he hoped the majority did 
“not mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic 
freedom in public colleges and universities.”136  In a vague response to 
this concern, Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]here is some argument 
that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom 
instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not 
fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech 
jurisprudence,” but added that such an issue was not before the 
Court.137 
Though Garcetti may indeed leave some future room for the speech 
of college instructors, the likelihood that any protections will fall to 
K-12 teachers is extremely small.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit noted in a post-Garcetti opinion, academic freedom 
for K-12 teachers is no longer even on the table.138  In Mayer v. Monroe 
County Community Corp.,139 the court rejected the appeal of a teacher 
who had been dismissed because she claimed she had offered her 
personal political views in a classroom current events discussion.140  
Not only did the court reject out-of-hand her argument that 
“principles of academic freedom” should prevent the court from 
applying the Garcetti standard, but it also turned down the previously 
acknowledged understanding that teachers have a special role that 
requires additional protections for speech.141  “[P]ublic-school 
teachers must hew to the approach prescribed by principals (and 
others higher up in the chain of authority),”142 Judge Easterbrook 
proclaimed, adding, in language that served both to deflate the role 
of teachers and inflate his own intellectual bona fides: 
[T]he school system does not “regulate” teachers’ speech as much 
as it hires that speech.  Expression is a teacher’s stock in trade, the 
commodity she sells to her employer in exchange for a salary.  A 
                                                 
 136. Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 425 (majority opinion). 
 138. See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479–80 (7th Cir. 
2007) (“Children who attend school because they must ought not be subject to 
teachers’ idiosyncratic perspectives…. [I]f indoctrination is likely, the power [to 
choose classroom subjects] should be reposed in someone the people can vote out of 
office, rather than tenured teachers.”).  
 139. 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 140. Id. at 478.  During the discussion, a student asked the teacher if she had ever 
participated in a demonstration, to which she answered that when passing a protest 
against the war in Iraq and seeing “a placard saying ‘Honk for Peace,’ she honked 
her car’s horn to show support for the demonstrators.”  Id. 
 141. Id. at 479–80. 
 142. Id. at 479. 
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teacher hired to lead a social-studies class can’t use it as a platform 
for a revisionist perspective that Benedict Arnold wasn’t really a 
traitor, when the approved program calls him one; a high-school 
teacher hired to explicate Moby-Dick in a literature class can’t use 
Cry, The Beloved Country instead, even if Paton’s book better suits 
the instructor’s style and point of view; a math teacher can’t decide 
that calculus is more important than trigonometry and decide to 
let Hipparchus and Ptolemy slide in favor of Newton and 
Leibniz.”143 
Still another aspect of Garcetti has helped undermine the previously 
recognized role teachers have to comment on potential problems in 
the world of education generally and their schools specifically.  As 
Justice Stevens stated, “it seems perverse to fashion a new rule that 
provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly 
before talking frankly to their superiors.”144  He distinguished the 
ruling with the Court’s earlier decision in Givhan v. Western Line 
Consolidated School District,145 noting that “[w]e had no difficulty 
recognizing that the First Amendment applied when Bessie Givhan, 
an English teacher, raised concerns about the school’s racist 
employment practices to the principal.  Our silence as to whether or 
not her speech was made pursuant to her job duties demonstrates 
that the point was immaterial.”146  In fact, Garcetti’s illogic makes a 
teacher’s ability to do his or her job in a responsible manner a 
liability. 
Thus, a high school science teacher who was also a sponsor of the 
cheerleading squad was punished for responding honestly to a 
questionnaire about the program—even though her supervisor 
requested her to reply to it—because she was speaking in her 
professional capacity and not as a citizen.147  Similarly, a federal 
district court in New York, relying on Garcetti, found no First 
Amendment protection for several New York City public school 
teachers forced to resign in retaliation after reporting that their 
supervisor had sexually harassed students and other teachers.148  
Although the supervisor was eventually fired after the allegations 
were substantiated, the reports filed by the teachers were held to be 
                                                 
 143. Id. 
 144. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 145. 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
 146. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 147. Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County Bd. of Educ., 186 F. App’x 885, 887 (11th Cir. 
2006). 
 148. Pearson v. Bd. of Educ., 499 F. Supp. 2d 575, 588–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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“an official duty” and therefore not covered under the Garcetti rule.149  
The absurdity of this policy is highlighted even further by the 
knowledge in that case that the school district policy mandated that 
employees report allegations of sexual harassment.150  Certain 
retaliatory actions taken against an educator attempting to meet a 
legal requirement, such as reporting workplace safety, sex 
discrimination, or age discrimination, will be prevented by federal 
law.151  But other actions, such as those involving the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) do not have such provisions.152  The 
illogic and counter-productivity of the Court’s approach is plain. 
III. CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FORTY-YEAR JOURNEY 
AWAY FROM COMMON SENSE—THREE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Four decades after the Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker, the two 
primary strands of legal analysis addressing teacher speech—the 
Tinker-Hazelwood and Pickering-Garcetti lines of cases—provide neither 
an intellectually satisfying, nor legally sound approach to the issue.  
What began as a sensible balancing of First Amendment rights, 
school disciplinary policy, and an understanding of the importance of 
dynamic, unhindered, and innovative teaching that should go into a 
school day, has evolved into a haphazard, arbitrary policy full of 
inconsistencies, exceptions, and a heavy bias toward limiting teacher 
speech.  The specter of punishment that hangs over a teacher as the 
result of a potentially controversial comment in the course of a lesson 
or in response to a student’s question teaches “more about 
subservience than about participation and civic courage.”153  The 
resulting self-censorship can often reach beyond classroom lessons to 
extra-curricular activities, such as school drama productions.154 
The Hazelwood “pedagogical concerns” rationale that has evolved is 
inappropriate to apply to teachers for a number of reasons.  The 
                                                 
 149. Id. at 589; see also Worley v. Webb Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. L-08-136, 
2009 WL 87781, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009) (finding no First Amendment 
protection under Garcetti for a teacher who claimed she was fired for reporting to the 
principal a report that a coach had abused another coach).   
 150. Id. at 584. 
 151. See Stuart, supra note 121, at 1308 (noting that “[a] small handful of federal 
civil rights statutes have anti-retaliation provisions”). 
 152. See id. (contrasting Olga Yatzus’ unsuccessful retaliation claim brought under 
IDEA and her “more successful” claim against the school district under Title VII). 
 153. Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment:  Constitutional Irrelevancies and the 
Demise of Dialogue, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1473, 1575–76 (1994). 
 154. See, e.g., Patrick Healy, Even a Tamer Version of ‘Rent’ Is Too Wild for Some Schools, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A1 (discussing how and for what reasons high school 
officials continue to cancel school productions of the Broadway musical Rent). 
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most basic is that it simply was never intended to address teacher 
speech.155  While there are numerous overlapping interests and 
applications between teachers and students, applying one analysis to 
both is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.  Teachers are 
likely to be far more involved with curricular (and broad education-
related) issues, so they are likely to suffer more than students when 
these legal standards are contracted.  Furthermore, the very nature 
and significance of teacher speech within the school means that 
virtually all teacher speech potentially raises pedagogical concerns.  
Not surprisingly perhaps, many courts have “misconstrued” a 
teacher’s speech as “speech on behalf of the school,” resulting in an 
“all-or-nothing” approach to discussion of legitimate pedagogical 
concerns that has led to significant diminution of teachers’ rights.156 
Likewise, the Pickering-Connick-Garcetti line of cases has seen its 
initial pragmatism left by the wayside as courts have created and over-
applied new rules and exceptions.157  Even acknowledging the 
importance of balancing the competing interests of teachers as 
citizens and members of a public institution (as well as influencers of 
individual students), the tests developed by the Court no longer 
provide teachers with the appropriate room to operate as the 
professionals they are.  The “matter of public concern” rule, for 
instance, is as one informed commentator noted, “strained, 
contrived, and nonsensical; how does one characterize instruction as 
a ‘matter of public concern’ or ‘not a matter of public concern’?”158  
Furthermore, it is barely respectful of teachers as citizens and 
“inadequate to guard the interests of teachers as professionals.”159  
The rule laid out by the Court in Garcetti not only limits arguably 
                                                 
 155. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding 
that educators do not violate a student’s First Amendment rights when they exert 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored 
activities, as long as they are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns”). 
 156. Daly, supra note 12, at 13–15. 
 157. See Neal Hutchens, supra note 75, at 59–61 (2008) (examining lower courts’ 
uncertainty and inconsistency in applying these standards to faculty members at 
public colleges and universities and theorizing that the First Amendment rights 
afforded to those professors will ultimately impact the protections provided to 
elementary and secondary school teachers). 
 158. Welner, supra note 22, at 1000. 
 159. Daly, supra note 12, at 11; see also Seog Hun Jo, The Legal Standard on the Scope 
of Teachers’ Free Speech Rights in the School Setting, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 413, 418 (2002) 
(arguing that the “logical flaw” in the Pickering balancing test is that “[w]hen 
determining who should be the models for the competing interests, if a teacher has 
to be ‘acting as a citizen,’ the counterpart should be the State ‘as a supplier of public 
services’ rather than ‘as an employer’”). 
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disruptive or otherwise problematic speech, but also removes the 
likelihood, or even the possibility, that teachers can or will make the 
kind of appropriate and positive contributions to a school, such as 
reporting illegal or counterproductive activities, upon which 
communities depend. 
The devolution in First Amendment protections for teachers since 
Tinker is further complicated because, as the two strands of legal 
analysis have worked individually to constrict the speech rights of 
teachers, the distinction between the two increasingly has been one 
without much of a difference.160  Fewer courts cite solely a Hazelwood 
rationale for upholding disciplinary actions against teachers for in-
class speech, and increasingly use the public employee analysis of 
Pickering and Garcetti to uphold those actions.161  Many relate not to 
curriculum issues, but to teachers’ in-class statements that parents 
and others perceived as ideological or political.162  Courts today often 
use the two forms of analysis interchangeably or in tandem, blurring 
the distinction and the reasoning for a distinction between in-class 
and extra-curricular communications.163  As one scholar succinctly put 
it, “the academy, not the academician, is the locus of ‘academic 
freedom’.”164  In fact, however, it is more than just the principle of 
academic freedom being lost in this power struggle.  It is the 
underlying value placed on innovative teaching and learning in our 
society, which in turn affects the value of a teacher within the 
education equation and the rigor of the educational system itself.165  
As one judge noted perceptively: 
                                                 
 160. See Hutchens, supra note 75, at 62 (discussing the confusion in the courts 
over “whether elementary and secondary public school teachers are subject to the 
Garcetti standards for speech related to curriculum or pedagogy or both”). 
 161. See Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core:  A New Approach to 
Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 79–80 (2008) (discussing the 
circuit split over the use of the two standards and noting that the Seventh Circuit 
recently adopted the Pickering analysis after following Hazelwood for nearly twenty 
years). 
 162. Stuart, supra note 121, at 1327.  
 163. See Welner, supra note 22, at 1009–10 (“Pursuant to Hazelwood, the First 
Amendment affords little oversight for curricular decisions.  Pursuant to Pickering, 
the First Amendment affords little oversight of decisions to punish or squelch private 
speech.  The dichotomies appear to leave no room for academic-freedom arguments 
protecting instructional techniques or curricular implementation that is too 
creative.”). 
 164. Donald Uerling, Academic Freedom in K-12 Education, 79 NEB. L. REV. 956, 958 
(2000). 
 165. See Welner, supra note 22, at 961–63 (noting that “educational experts 
strongly support the instructional inclusion of controversial issues to foster the 
development of skills needed for effective participation as a citizen in a democracy, 
as well as the development of interpersonal and critical thinking skills”). 
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When a teacher steps into the classroom she assumes a position of 
extraordinary public trust and confidence:  she is charged with 
educating our youth.  Her speech is neither ordinary employee 
workplace speech nor common public debate.  Any attempt to 
force it into either of these categories ignores the essence of 
teaching—to educate, to enlighten, to inspire—and the 
importance of free speech to this most critical endeavor.166 
 
* * * * * 
 
There may be a positive side to merging these two strands of 
thought;  they can be mutually supportive, thereby providing an 
opportunity to restore the underlying meaning and principles behind 
the long legal history of education and teachers.167  Further, along 
with the restoration of this kind of freedom can come a link to 
greater accountability by teachers.  To this end, this Article suggests 
three specific areas in which there may be opportunities for 
corrective action: 
A. Legislative and Contractual Responses 
Since the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood and threw a monkey 
wrench into the already challenging First Amendment calculus of the 
school environment, numerous local and state governments have 
enacted, or sought to enact, legislation intended to safeguard rights 
that were delineated prior to that decision.168  While most of these 
have addressed the concerns of students, more recent efforts have 
added limited protections of teacher speech rights, usually in 
combination with the student speech protections.  In Kentucky, for 
instance, a bill introduced in the state House of Representatives 
                                                 
 166. Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 378 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(Motz, J., dissenting). 
 167. See Welner, supra note 22, at 1017 (citing Professor William Foster, who 
explained that “if teachers ‘are to be held accountable, they must be given the power 
to make their own decisions regarding instruction’”). 
 168. See Wohl, supra note 75, at 16–36 (discussing and evaluating the efficacy of 
state legislative alternatives, including constitutional amendments and legislative 
initiatives, aimed at reclaiming students’ First Amendment rights after Hazelwood).  
Among the most recent efforts are those in California, Kentucky, and Connecticut.  
To date, seven states have enacted legislation restoring the First Amendment 
protection to high school media that existed prior to Hazelwood.  See, e.g., Conn. Senate 
Considers Anti-Hazelwood Bill, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER, Mar. 3, 2009, 
https://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1874&year=2009 (detailing a Connecticut 
bill that would protect all student speech, “provided it is not ‘demonstrably likely to 
cause material and substantial disruption to the educational process’ or constitute an 
invasion of privacy”). 
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earlier this year seeks to restore the rights of student journalists that 
existed prior to Hazelwood, by ensuring free speech and press 
“whether or not the media are supported financially by the school or 
by use of school facilities or are produced in conjunction with a high 
school class.”169  That legislation would also provide retaliation 
protection for faculty members who are newspaper advisors.170  Two 
states, California and Kansas, already have laws with similar provisions 
protecting teachers and advisors.171   
There have also been efforts to produce legislation protecting 
general speech rights of teachers.  But some of these have a reverse 
intent.  In Florida, for example, a number of “academic freedom” 
bills have been introduced or considered in recent years that would 
purportedly protect teachers (and students) from harassment or 
retaliation.172  But a quick look at the debate over them makes clear 
the underlying political challenges.  One bill introduced in Florida 
last year would provide protection for science teachers discussing 
theories critical of evolution.173  In an effort to provide some form of 
equal treatment (or perhaps just highlight the ideological 
underpinnings of the legislative effort), an amendment was proposed 
to the legislation that would have given teachers in abstinence-only 
sex education programs legal cover to respond to students’ questions 
about “an unwanted pregnancy.”174  Not surprisingly, in the 
Republican-controlled Florida Senate, the amendment was defeated 
by voice vote.175 Still other legislation has been offered that would 
punish public school teachers for a lack of impartiality in the 
classroom.  But as is often the problem with these types of “solutions,” 
                                                 
 169. H.B. 43, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2009). 
 170. See id. (providing that “[a] student media adviser may not be terminated, 
transferred, removed, or otherwise disciplined for refusing to suppress the protected 
expression of student journalists”). 
 171. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 2009) (drawing a distinction where 
expression is obscene, libelous, or slanderous); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72.1504–72.1506 
(1992) (forbidding the suppression of student journalism simply because it involves 
political or controversial subject matter); see also Robert Lopez, New Law Protects School 
Journalism Advisors, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at B4.   
 172. Keith Morelli, Storms’ Evolution Bill Lets Teachers Contradict Theory, TAMPA BAY 
TRIB., Mar. 3, 2008, http://www2.tbo.com/content/2008/mar/03/storms-evolution-
bill-lets-teachers-contradict-the/. 
 173. S.B. 2692, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2008). 
 174. Linda Kleindienst, No Free Speech Shield for Sex Ed Teachers, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Apr. 19, 2008, at 8B. 
 175. Id.  Ronda Storms, the state senator who had introduced the legislation on 
protecting teachers who teach creationist theories opposed the bill protecting sex 
education teachers, noting, “I’m concerned about prematurely deflowering 
kindergartners and first- and second-graders.”  Id. 
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one person’s impartiality is another’s ideological agenda.176  Add to 
this the problem of students potentially monitoring teachers and 
taking lessons or statements out of context and the challenge 
becomes even greater.177  But these kinds of partisan battles do not 
necessarily mean that such legislation is unachievable.  Indeed, 
beyond the underlying ideological conflicts (conflicts perhaps 
neither side is willing to fully recognize) is a shared understanding 
that teachers frequently face unfair limits and penalties just for doing 
their job.  Since the First Amendment at its core does not favor one 
political party or ideology over another, reasonable, intelligent public 
officials should be able to come together in support of American 
education and produce legislation that provides fair protections for 
such an essential activity. 
The second reason why legislative options have found only limited 
success is that a number of protections for teachers are, or can be 
included in, collective bargaining agreements.  Indeed, although 
teachers’ unions today encounter many of the same kind of 
ideological attacks as contained in the aforementioned legislation, 
historically, unions have provided essential dignity and 
professionalism, as well as certain on-the-job protections to a 
profession that had few such protections and was often treated 
arbitrarily and abusively by administrators.178  Some collective 
bargaining agreements today also include language protecting 
“academic freedom.”179  Though such provisions do not close the 
door on the potential for legal limits or action, by their very existence 
they help ensure recognition by both teachers and administrators of 
the importance of this issue, the role teachers play, and, perhaps 
                                                 
 176.  See Jessica Coomes, Teachers’ Political Talk Issue Heats Up, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, 
Feb. 27, 2009 (noting some teachers’ fears that discussions of controversial topics 
could be taken out of context as teachers standing on their soapboxes).  
 177. Vaishali Honawar, Cellphones in Classrooms Land Teachers on Online Video 
Sites, EDUCATION WEEK, Nov. 7, 2007, at 1. 
 178. See, e.g., RICHARD KAHLENBERG, TOUGH LIBERAL:  ALBERT SHANKER AND THE 
BATTLES OVER SCHOOLS, UNIONS, RACE, AND DEMOCRACY 32–42 (2007) (detailing how 
Albert Shanker’s experience teaching in New York City public schools led to his 
efforts to organize the United Federation of Teachers and his ultimate success in 
procuring collective bargaining rights). 
 179. It is interesting to note that in a research project involving teacher focus 
groups, teachers who were asked about “academic freedom” consistently referred to 
the concept of professionalism.  As one teacher noted, “[y]ou get a little [academic 
freedom] when they hired you,” and full academic freedom is “contingent upon a 
demonstration of competence.”  Kim Fries, Vincent J. Connelly & Todd A. 
DeMitchell, Academic Freedom in the Public K-12 Classroom:  Professional Responsibility or 
Constitutional Right?  A Conversation with Teachers, 227 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 505, 521 
(Feb. 21, 2008). 
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most importantly, the understanding that “professional judgment” 
shall be exercised.180  Additionally, in some states, teachers have a 
layer of protection through “just cause” provisions in their collective 
bargaining agreements that prevent discharge and disciplinary 
actions without “just cause.”181  Not all teachers are covered by such 
agreements, however, and, therefore, they are the “most vulnerable” 
to school board retaliation.182 
B. Technological Developments 
As new technologies change the way we communicate, the 
dynamics of teachers’ speech, and specifically the line between in-
school or in-class communications and out-of-school 
communications, is becoming increasingly less clear.  “‘Classroom’ is 
a term that no longer simply encompasses a room in a school with 
some desks and a chalkboard.”183  Even more significant, in terms of 
the legal distinctions courts have to make, is that communications 
and exchanges by and between teachers and students are taking on 
new dimensions as both groups make greater use of alternative 
technologies, resulting in a virtual breaking down of the schoolhouse 
gate.  For example, a federal judge in Connecticut recently upheld 
                                                 
 180. North Kitsap School District Contract, Art. IV, § 6, Academic Freedom, 
available at http://www.nkschools.org/15891052891214933/site/default.asp (follow 
“Bargaining Agreements” link; then follow “NKEA Final Contract 2007–2009”).  The 
pertinent text of Section 6 reads: 
Academic freedom must be exercised consistent with the curriculum of the 
District.  Teachers shall take into account the relative immaturity of their 
students and the need for guidance and help in studying controversial issues. 
Teachers shall use prudent professional judgment in planning the inclusion 
of controversial issues or resources in classroom presentations.  The 
foregoing matters shall be discussed with the teacher’s building principal.  
Guest speakers and their materials shall be discussed with the teacher’s 
building principal for approval. 
Id.; see also Stuart, supra note 121, at 1340 (including text of a contract between Fort 
Wayne Community Schools and Fort Wayne Education Association providing that 
teachers may exercise “academic freedom,” but that freedom must be balanced by 
“academic responsibility”). 
 181. Stuart, supra note 121, at 1302 n.153. 
 182. Id.  Yet another way in which teachers are protected from arbitrary 
administrative sanctions, including dismissal, is through the tenure system.  See 
Kahlenberg, supra note 178, at 283.  Although tenure today is often a target of 
criticism for what some have charged is its protection of inadequate teachers, see, e.g., 
Editorial, Timeout for Teachers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-tenure11-
2008dec11,0,6851509.story, it also can offer an important means for ensuring job 
protections against arbitrary actions taken against legitimate teacher speech, as well 
as a standard for evaluating such claims.    
 183. See Martin, supra note 10, at 1183–84 (including a reference and link to the 
Global Virtual Classroom). 
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the school principal’s decision to suspend a high school student 
because of comments she included on her private blog.184  As the 
judge explained, “[o]ff-campus speech can become on-campus 
speech with the click of a mouse.”185  With relatively few cases testing 
the limits of online speech, the law is still evolving, offering plenty of 
opportunity to positively shape its development.186 
The growth of personal web pages and social networking sites like 
Facebook and MySpace, which both teachers and students use, 
provides numerous additional opportunities for students and 
teachers to communicate—or at least reference each other’s 
communications—often on matters that are decidedly non-
curricular. Some school districts have implemented policies that 
make both teachers and students legally responsible for anything 
posted online, including material deemed defamatory, obscene, 
proprietary, or libelous.187 Others have begun to institute policies for 
screening potential employees based on materials on their personal 
MySpace or Facebook pages.  In one report, two thirds of employers 
say they have chosen not to hire a person because of what is posted 
online, a scenario similar to what many students find when they apply 
for college or jobs.188  Increasing numbers of employer-employee 
                                                 
 184. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 212–16 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 185. See Arielle Levin Becker, Web Speech:  When May Schools Act?, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Feb. 1, 2009, at A1 (reporting on the court’s decision and state lawmakers’ 
attempt to prevent schools from punishing students for communications made off-
campus); see also Scott Ross, ‘D Bag’ Bill Would Protect Online Free Speech, NBC CONN., 
Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/LeBeau-Takes-Free-
Speech-Fight-to-Internet.html (discussing Avery Doninger’s removal from the 
student government after she referred to school officials as “douche bags” on her 
private blog and lawmakers’ interest in the issue). 
 186. See Frank LoMonte, Reaching Through the Schoolhouse Gate:  Students Eroding 
First Amendment Rights in a Cyber-Speech World, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, Feb. 2009, at 2, 
http://www.acslaw.org/files/LoMonte%20Issue%20Brief.pdf (noting that most of 
these cases have dealt with online postings that attacked teachers or school 
administrators, rather than content that was purely journalistic). 
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28 INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., Mar. 12, 2007, at 20.  A different kind of regulation of 
speech, to address a different kind of problem precipitated by the use of technology 
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eliminate the potential for sexual involvements between teachers and students. See 
Brittany Brown, School Board Issues Warning, HATTIESBURG AMERICAN, July 21, 2008; 





 188. Michael W. Hoskins, Courts grapple with issues arising from Internet, blogs,  
28 INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., March 12, 2007, at 20.   
  
2009] OILING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 1317 
disputes are revolving around these kinds of Internet-based 
communications.  In Spanierman v. Hughes,189 for instance, a Court 
dismissed a challenge by a teacher who had been dismissed because 
the teacher’s MySpace page, which he purportedly used to 
communicate with students about homework, included other 
inappropriate subject matter.190 The Court appropriately did not give 
First Amendment protection to the material and ruled that the one 
claim the teacher had raised—that he was being fired for comments 
about the Iraq war—were not connected to the firing. In similar 
cases, courts have distinguished non-pornographic material on these 
personal sites that is nonetheless offensive and problematic for the 
teacher’s relationships with students, and “not the sort of information 
that parents want students to know about their teachers.”191  The 
tougher questions for school systems and courts  arise when the 
“questionable” material on these personal sites is not intended  for 
the use of students, but because of the nature of Web-based 
communications, students nonetheless find their way to it.192 
Of course, teachers’ private lives have never been completely 
private.  For as long as teachers have been teaching, they have been 
held to various moral, aesthetic, and political standards.  One 1915 
document that outlined rules for teachers (and that is today often 
seen on teacher workroom or classroom walls as a joke) noted that 
“you are not to keep company with men” and “you must under no 
circumstances dye your hair.”193  The developments in technology will 
have growing legal implications and, in some cases, are likely to lead 
to increased limitations on teacher speech, as the comment by the 
federal judge in Connecticut suggested.194  One potential response 
will be legislative.  A Connecticut state senator who is a former civics 
teacher has been working to enact legislation that would prohibit 
schools from punishing students for any non-threatening electronic 
correspondence transmitted outside school facilities and not on 
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school equipment.195  At the same time, these technological 
advancements present the opportunity for greater recognition of 
teacher professionalism, as well as increased demonstrations of 
teacher responsibility, and improved preparation in the form of 
enhanced training in education colleges.196  Ultimately, to ensure 
maximum benefits and minimal harm, this “brave new world” will 
require action in all of these areas. 
C. Rehabilitating the Reputation of Teachers 
In Fraser, the Court stated that the process of education must not 
be “confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools 
must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order.”197  
There are few more qualified than a teacher to advance this effort.198  
And what better way to demonstrate these “shared values of a civilized 
social order” than through a robust classroom dialogue?  Yet too 
often, administrators limit the communication, activities, and reach 
of teachers, through either actual punishment or the threat of 
sanctions.  The result is that students are not only denied the 
opportunity to experience, learn, and dissect ideas or materials, but 
they get an eye-opening experience about a system that does not 
celebrate intellectual freedom.199 
It is necessary to develop an affirmative strategy that paves the way 
for courts to restore precedent that recognizes the importance of 
teachers’ innovation.  This will require building an understanding, in 
both the legal arena and elsewhere, of the significance of a teacher’s 
role in strengthening schools and developing critical thinking skills 
in students.  There are a number of opportunities to pursue this 
strategy as a result of the many education reforms being considered 
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on both the national and local levels.200  But it will also require 
factual, anecdotal, and sociological evidence.  Equally important is 
the need to provide courts and others involved in the legal process a 
more complete and accurate understanding of what teachers really 
do:  the contributions they make to students and the community, 
what their daily work involves, and the infrequency of problems 
resulting from unhindered teacher speech.  Such an approach would 
contrast well with the hackneyed, often politically inspired 
stereotypes of teachers and teaching that too often make their way 
into, not only public discourse, but legal opinions.201  In contrast to 
what former Judge J. Michael Luttig suggested, teachers do not want 
their classrooms to “become mere instruments for the advancement 
of the[ir] individual and collective social agendas.”202  Indeed, on 
most days, the vast majority of teachers are simply struggling to find 
the time to prepare lessons that will provide guidance and training 
for young minds seeking to succeed in a rapidly changing world.  
They do this often in the face of classes that are too large, budgets 
and salaries that are too small, school buildings that are frequently 
unsafe or unhealthy, and constant oversight and input from school 
boards, principals, and parents on curriculum and virtually every 
other matter.203 
CONCLUSION 
After forty years of tinkering with and diluting the First 
Amendment rights of teachers, the legal challenges facing teachers 
today are far greater than they were in the 1960s.  The passage of 
time and the rulings of the courts have not been good to those who 
believe in even limited academic freedom or freedom of speech in 
the education workplace.  The issue is no longer one of “elementary 
                                                 
 200. See id. at 1010–20 (examining the decentralization, professionalization, and 
school choice reforms, all of which aim to give more power to teachers, students, and 
parents). 
 201. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 372 (4th Cir. 
1998) (Luttig, J., concurring) (“I agree fully  with . . . the majority that the First 
Amendment does not . . . allow individual teachers . . . to determine the curriculum for 
their classrooms consistent with their own personal, political, and other views.”). 
 202. Id. at 373. 
 203. See, e.g., RICHARD INGERSOLL, CENTER FOR STUDY OF TEACHING AND POLICY,  
TEACHER TURNOVER, TEACHER SHORTAGES, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SCHOOLS 21, 
(Dec. 2001), available at http://depts.washington.edu/ctpmail/PDFs/Turnover-Ing-
01-2001.pdf (discussing the variety of frustrations teachers face that contribute to 
high teacher turnover);  Michelle Rhee, Teaching—The Toughest Job, WASH. POST, Feb. 
9, 2009, at A17 (describing the challenges and hardships faced by D.C. public school 
teachers and the reforms aimed at improving those schools). 
  
1320 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1285 
and secondary teachers armed with extensive First Amendment 
academic freedoms running amok in the classroom and disregarding 
the approved curriculum.”204  Rather, the challenge is restoring in the 
schools and courts some semblance of a consistent, yet limited 
protection for teachers, which allows them to fulfill the full measure 
of their profession—challenging and shaping young minds and 
strengthening the educational system and our nation. 
The evolution of the law on teacher speech has been relatively 
straightforward, albeit not always logical or consistent with the goal of 
building an environment that encourages innovation and the 
teaching of critical thinking skills.  The cases reflect a cross section of 
the social issues that regularly percolate across our nation.  
“[T]eachers’ free speech cases,” as one commentator noted, “do not 
fit neatly into a single pattern.”205  In part, that is because teachers 
themselves do not fit neatly into a single pattern.  The types of 
conflicts that teachers face—and even whether those conflicts ever 
materialize—depend a great deal on the characteristics of an 
individual teacher, including his background, age, where she is from 
and where she works, level of independence and industriousness, and 
other factors.  Some teachers will not push the boundaries on so-
called controversial speech, if for no other reason than the subject 
matter they teach does not lend itself to that.  For instance, 
“[g]eometry teachers may seldom say anything on the job that is a 
matter of public concern, [while s]ocial studies teachers or law 
professors regularly speak on matters of public concern.”206  Some 
teachers are more aggressive, take more initiative, or have more 
creativity or courage, and therefore are less likely to be threatened by 
a school administrator’s sword of Damocles that hangs over them.  In 
short, teachers, like virtually any other segment of the population, are 
a diverse group, which is reflected by the case law.207 
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The historians Ariel and Will Durant wrote that “education is the 
transmission of civilization.”208  But it is also the reflection of a 
civilization.  The rigor of our schools, how challenging the classes are, 
how innovative the teachers are allowed to be, how free the process 
is, and how much the vision that new ideas are not to be feared, but 
embraced is reaffirmed—each shape not simply our education 
system, but our nation.  “Teachers and students must always remain 
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die,” the 
Court wrote more than half a century ago.209  Tinker reaffirmed this 
understanding and awareness.  If we as a nation are to continue to be 
defined by such bold, yet commonsense philosophies, then it is 
imperative we restore that understanding and approach. 
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